The question of how the stock market values pension assets and liabilities is of central importance to corporate decision nakrs, financial econDsts and economists concerned with level of national savings. If investors treat pension debt differently from other forms of debt, in valuing firms, prudent value maximizing managers should recognize these differences and adjust their pension funding policies acordingly. A convincing demonstration that market valuations failed to take account of pension assets or liabilities would either challenge prevailing theories of market efficiency and rational valuation, or force a re-examination of conventional views about effective ownership of pension claims. 'inally, if potential beneficiaries of pensions recognized the value of the pensions and adjusted their savings accordingly, hut no comparable adjustment occurred because holders of pension liabilities did not recognize their liabilities, or were confident of their ability to shift then to some other source such as the PBGC, then pensions would reduce national savings.
These effects might he quite significant,. Contributions to private pensions represented 58 percent of personal savings in 1977.
A number of empirical studies including Oldfield (1971), Feldst,ein and Seligman (1981) , Feldstein and Mrck (1983) , Gersovitz (1980) and Westerfieli and Marshall (1983) have attempted to study the markets valuation of pension liahilities using cross-sectional valuation models. Other analysts have taken the position that the overwiielming empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis of market efficiency, makes studying the market valuation of pension assets and liabilities irrelevant. This position seems unwarranted. A great deal of controversy as reflected in Modigliani-Cohn (1971) , Summers (1981) and French, Ruhack and Schwert (l993 focuses on the effects of inflation on firms! nominal assets and liabilities. 51urthermore, if the supposition of rational valuation is accepted, studies of the market valuation effect of changes in pension liabilities offer an ideal methodology for examining the true ownership of pension claims.
In adding to the already fairly extensive empirical literature on the valuation of pension assets and liabilities, this paper makes two significant innovations. First, we report results using a "variable effect" event study methodology, for studying the valuation of pension claims. This methodology is far superior to the traditional cross-sectional valuation model approach for examining the determinants of market valuations. Indeed, we suggest that identification is highly problematic using standard approaches. Second, following recent work by Bulow (1982) , Lazear (1983) , and others we recognize that pensions may only he one aspect of complicated contracts through which firms offer workers deferred compensation. If deferred compensation is an important aspect of the labor market, one would expect it to leave traces in the market valutions of otherwise equivalent firms with demographically different labor forces. We examine this issue using both the standard cross-section and the "variable effect" event study methodology. In addition to these innovations, the availability of a larger and more recent data set made it possible for us to replicate the estimates presented in earlier studies and examine their robustness.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 examines the theoretical relationships between pension assets and liabilities and the market valuation of firms. A number of possible reasons why unfunded pension liabilities may not reduce equity valuations dollar for dollar are considered. Section -3-II presents evidence on the relationship between pension obligations and rket valuations using standard cross-sectional techniques. Other forms of deferred compensation are also considered. Our doubts about cross-sectional methodologies are also discussed. Section III presents estimates of the eff'ect of pension obligations on market valuation using the variable effect event stu; methodolo. We argue that this methodolo provides a superior basis for testing market valuation issues than does the standard approach. While the available evidence is weak, it does tend to corroborate standard theories regarding the economic effects of pension obligations. Finally, Section I'J presents our conclusions and suggests directions for future research.
V&L[JING A FIRM'S NET PENSION WEALTH
A nunber of empirical studies have attempted to examine the extent to which market valuations of firm equity accurately reflect firms pension positions. These studies have typically not discussed in any detail how rational investors should combine a firm's regular balance sheet and its pension position in valuing it. It turns out, however, that because of complexities engendered by the legal nature of the pension contract, the nature of the longterm implicit contracts between workers and firms, and the tax code; the valuation of pension assets and liabilities is quite a subtle issue. This section begins by sketching a naive benchmark model for evaluating firms' pension positions and then considers five qualifications to it. These qualifications provide the basis for much of the empirical discussion in the next two sections.
Perhaps the simplest model of a defined benefit plan is the "consolidated balance sheet" approach. In this approach, pension liabilities are defined on a "quit" basis--what workers would receive if they individually quit the firm today, or their vested benefits--and those obligations are treated like a general corporate liability. Pension assets are similarly treated as a general corporate asset, so any difference between pension assets and liabilities is part of net shareholder wealth. On this view unfunded pension liabilities should reduce firms' market value dollar-for-dollar.
ERISA's Effect on the Pension Obligation
The first qualification to this simple model is that it does not take into account the special legal nature of the pension liability. Prior to ERISA enployees' pension benefits were nonrecourse claims against corporate pension assets. Because of the workers' nonrecourse claim we noild think of the firm's net pension wealth as being an option on the fund's assets, F, with an exercise price equal to V, vested benefits. If we think of the firm and its employees a constantly negotiating over the levels of F and V so that either side alwas had the ability to force immediate exercise of the option, then the firm's net pension wealth would he mx (o,_v), and workers' net pension wealth would be min (F,V) With the passage of ERISA firms are liable for varying sums denending on the level of guaranteed benefits 0 (which in terminations in the first few years of PBGC existence averaged •f'5 of vested benefits), accrued benefits A (which because they include nonvested benefits slightly exceed vested benefits), the amount of money in the pension fund F, and the market value of the firm's equity F.
Following Ruby (l9B2) we can make a table of the firm's total pension obligations and unfunded liability as a function of these four variables: 
Note that in case (1), a severely underfunded plan, the firm's pension liability is less than the present value of worker's benefits. The difference is nade up by the P300 through its "insurance" program, and is often referred to -6-as the pension put.
An empirical implication of the valuation mdcl implied in Table I is the that firms with overfunded pensions (where F > A) are the residual claimants in their plans and should benefit from increases in F (through plan asset growth) and decreases in A (caused by interest rate increases that decrease the present value of accrued benefits). Again in the case where 0 C F + .3E C 0 + .3F the 'irm is the residual claimant. However, in cases (i) and (3), for vastly underfunded plans and for those with 0 C A C F the firm is not the residual claimant and should be unaffected by changes in pension asset and liability values, Of course, if we realistically assume that pension policy cannot be instantaneously revised then the firm nay he a partial gainer or loser fron changes in pension asset and liability valuation. For example, following Sharpe (1977) one might view the firm as having a call option on the assets of the Sund F at an exercise price A, so changes in F and A change the value of that option but not dollar for dollar with A-F. On average, though, we would expect firms with overfanded pension plans to have valuations that are more sensitive to pension asset and liability values than firms with less well funded ulans. We test this hypothesis in the next two sections.
Implicit Contracting
A second qualification to the benchmark analysis of pension obligations is that one may be reluctant to take literally all the aspects of the employment contract. For example, firns often raise the benefits of already retired workers and workers nay find their pension benefits much higher if they leave a finn just after qualifying for early retirement rather than just before. A literal view of individuals' pension wealth would say that increasing benefits to retired workers is a gift of the firm and that a worker accumulates a large amount of wealth the day he becomes eligible for early retirement. Neither assumption seems very satisfying. Bulow and Scholen (1983) make the argument that in fact. compensation is negotiated cross-sectionally between a firm and its employees, either explicitly through a union or implicitly. Workers bargain for part of the nuasi-rents earned by firms and have some leeway as to how to split those rents among themselves. Their model allows for the possibility that sometimes a worker will he paid much more than marginal product, such as when retirement benefits are raised or early retirement eligibility is attained. Their measure of worker compensation in a period is the salary, pension and other benefits legally accrued during the period (the workers' extra compensation if they all left at the end of the period rather than at its beginning) plus any increment in the present value of the quasi-rents that the workers expect to be able to negotiate with the firm. In particular, it is widely believed that workers benefit from their firm's reinvestment in their industry. Bulow and Scholes argue the reason is that even if such investment did not change the marginal product of the last worker employed in the firm, average product would be greater and the workers would be in a position as a group to negotiate greater compensation. Similarly, increases in pension assets may affect the workers' bargaining ability with their employers. A company with extra cash in its pension fund may find its workers are able to bargain for a better deal, implying that part of any gain on the pension portfolio will find its way to the workers. 
Tax Effects
The fourth issue which causes significant conceptual difficulty in valuing a firm's net claim on its pension fund is taxes. For simplicity we will confine our analysis here primarily to the case of an overfunded plan, making the assumption that the firm can use any excess assets to reduce future pension costs and thus bear the entire risk of changes in pension asset and liability values. Therefore, we will he placing an upper bound on the value of an increment in pension assets to a firm.
We limit our discussions to three tax issues that have not received wide attention among pension researchers. The first is an explicit calculation of the value of being overfunded. The second is the implications of that calculation for changes in pension asset and liability valuation. The third is simply that overfunding a pension fund can serve many of the sane purposes as a stock repurchase, with better tax implications. We use as an arbitrary benchmark a plan which is always funded at the level of accrued benefits.
(Defined contribution plans are generally like this.) We compare such a plan with one where the plan is funded at some level c(s) at time s where F(s) may differ from the level of accrued benefits. Then it is easy to show that the tax advantage to having a defined benefit plan is equal to the present value of interest earned on pension assets in excess of pension liabilities, times the tax rate on pension contributions.
To illustrate this point we introduce the following notation: Let r = pre-tax market interest rate 11 = marginal tax rate of the firm 12 = implicit tax rate the firm pays on investment income; that is its after-tax discount rate is r(l-t2) We compare the tax benefits of beginning a plan at time t, making an initial contribution F(t), and subsequently operating with funding at level F(s)
versus making an initial contribution of A(t) and subsequently renaming fully funded at level A(s).
With funding maintained at level t'(s) the present value of after-tax future pension contributions needed to supply a benefit stream B(s is
The present value of contributions to a plan that is always fully funded is
The tax saving from funding at level F is simply (3) minus (2) (1.14)
This formula is most understandable by considering some extreme cases. irst, asume 12 = 0: there is no tax paid on investment income earned outside the pension fund. Then there is no advantage to funding per se and an increase in F of one dollar will raise firm value by 1-1,, the amount of money the firm would get if it were able to immediately withdraw the extra dollar from the plan. Second, consider the oft-considered case where 12 = 11 = 'r: the implicit tax rate on corporate non-pension investment income is the same as the corporate marginal rate of T (generally considered 146 percent). This view is consistent with that of Miller's (1977) model of corporate finance. Furthermore, assume that T = the increment in pension assets does not have to be amortized and the firm may be overfunded by an extra dollar forever. Then the increment in firm value is AF. Of this gain of AF, then, F(l-'t) is created because the value of assets in the pension fund (which holds pre-tax assets) has risen by AF. Also, because those F dollars will earn returns of rAP' each year forever instead of r(l-t)AF as non-pension assets would earn, there is an annual saving in pension costs of rid? because of the tax-sheltered nature of the pension returns. The after-tax value of this saving is riAF(l-T). If we discount this saving at the after-tax rate of r(l-T), we find that the present value of the tax saving from being able to remain overfunded forever is
If in fact we assume 15 years amortization of excess funding, that 'I = '2 = .146, and that pre-tax interest rates are 10 percent, then (1.14) implies that a firm's value should rise by approximately 12 cents for each dollar its pension assets rise in value. There is an asymmetry on the loss side in that while excess assets will be defunded as slowly as possible asset shortfalls will be made up as quickly as allowed. Of course, if a funding deficiency could he made up instantly then the cost to a firm of a decline in the value of its pension assets would he 5)4 cents. Because of the asymmetry firms have a mitigated incentive to establish "dedicated" bond portfolios which preclude gains or losses on a fraction of their pension obligations. Changes in the value of pension liabilities are a bit more complicated. The reason is that funding limitations are based on the book value of liabilities rather than market value. If interest rates rise, causing the value of liabilities to fall, in the short run the firm will he sore overfunde than before. This overfunding will only be recognized for funding limitation purposes through the channel of the firm's pension assets earning a return greater than the plan's actuarial rate. As these greater returns are earned each year they must then be amortized as experience gains. Thus changes in liability values will end up being effectively amortized more slowly than changes in asset values and a slightly higher coefficient would he expected is the sensitivity of firm value to changes in pension liabilities than to changes in pension assets.
Finally, we note the large amount of corporate stock and other assets held in private pension plans. Numerous firms hold pension assets in excess of' the market value of firm equity. Because pension contributions are tax-deductible, except for the fact that transfer of assets to a pension fund may involve a transfer of corporate wealth from stockholders to employees pension overfunding seems to dominate corporate share repurchases on two grounds. First is the deductibility of contributions, and second the fund can use money to hold a wider variety of assets than just the firm's own stock. As such, we might expect excess pension fund contributions to provide a signalling role much like that of dividends and repurchases. Rowever, we leave this last point for future research.
Investor Rationality A fifth reason that changes in firms' pension assets and liabilities -1 '4-may not be reflected dollar-for-dollar in stock prices is that the market maY he inefficient in valuing pension liabilities. While this reason may seem implausible, concern over the effect of large pension contributions on reported earnings may he one of the reasons that managements often contribute ioh lesc to their pension funds than they are permitted by TES regulations.
Other studies such as Prench, Ruhack, and Schwert (1993) have indicated that it is difficult to find the effect of the change in the market value of conventional debt on stock prices. Pension debt, which does not appear on corporate balance sheets and has only recently appeared in any form in the footnotes, may thus he discounted by the market because of its comolexity.
In this section we have discussed a number of reasons why a naive model of changes in a firm's net pension wealth being reflected dollar-for-dollar in stock market valuation may fail. In particular, we have discussed the details of ERISA, implicit contracting issues, the correlation between pension and nonpension compensation, tax effects, and investor rationality in valuing pension claims. In the subsequent sections cf the paper we attempt to estimate what in fact is the relation between a firm's pension assets and liabilities and the market value of its equity.
-15-2.
CROSS-SECTIONAL VALUATION MODELS
The ectent to which share prices reflect unfunded pension ohligctions is a key issue in considering the effect of private pensions on national savings. It has been argued (Feldstein l98 ) that if unfunded pension liabilities are not fully reflected in stock prices, equity owners will save less and consume more than they would in a world where perceptions were correct.
National savings might thus he reduced by the introduction of private pensions.
For this reason and because of intrinsic interest as an aspect of financial behavior a series of pioneering papers including Oldfield (l91), Feldstein and Seligman (1981) , Gersovitz (1980) , and Feldstein and Mrck (1953) have endeavored to explore this issue. These efforts have focused on listing variables likely to he determinants of a firms market value. If an effect of unfunded pension liabilities on market value can he detected after these ot}er likely factors are controlled for, the studies conclude that unfunded pension obligations influence share prices. Feldstein and Mrck (1983) , for example, nodel a firm's market value (v) per dollar of net assets (A) as depending on the firms future earrings potential, its riskiness, its leverage, and (perhaps) its pension obligations. As proxies for future earnings potential, they use the firm's current earnings (E), its historical growth rate in earnings (GEOW) and its research and development spending (RD). They enloy the firm's beta as a measure of risk, and the market value of its debt as a fraction of net assets as a leverage indicator. Preliminary to this study, we replicated the Feldstein/Mtrck regressions using a much larger body of more recent data. Although their result could he reproduced, it was quite unstable. Seemingly innocuous changes in the sanple made it come or go. The estimated coefficients on the proxies for future earnings potential --especially on GROW --were also disturbingly unstable.
In this section, we shall point out severe problems inherent in the cross-sectional valuation methodolo' used by these previous authors. We then suggest alternative more satisfactory cross-sectional estimating equations.
Estimation of these equations yields results consistent with Feldstein and
Mtrck's conclusion that pension liabilities are largely reflected in a firms market valuation.
Problems with the Cross-Sectional Valuation
The lack of robustness of the Felstein-Mrck equations when replicated These two alternatives may be written as:
Note that neither of these equations includes an error tern. The standard procedure in estimating a cross-sectional valuation equation seems to he to deflate both sides of (2.3) by an estimate of the replacement value of the firm's capital stock, insert proxies for whatever assets and liabilities are easily measured in the equation, and then try to adhere to the spirit of Firms with low value assets will tend to have low market values and because of financial pressure will tend to underfund their pension funds. As a result a spurious negative association between firm value and unfunded pension liahilities may be observed. This is addressed in Table 2 .2 by using two different techniques. Second, in the second half of the table UVPL is treated as an endoqenous variable and is instrumented using the firm's total pension liabilities.
The justification is that the total size of the firm's liabilities is independent of its funding policy, and so should he a satisfactory instrument. It obviously should also be correlated with the firm's level of unfunded liabilities and so should provide reasonably efficient estimates.
The results unambigu.osly and robustly point to a negative relationshio between a firm's unfunded vested pension liabilities and its market value.
Using either of our two procedures for controlling for weak firm effects, the absolute value of the UVPL coefficient actually increases. While the standard errors are large, we are able to find no evidence that weak firm problems account for these results, suggesting that the market penalizes firms with unfunded pension liahiities.
The discussion in the previous section suggested that the marginal effect of reduced pension liabilities nay he different for underfunded than for overfunded plans. The analysis of section 1 implies that generally stockholders will gain more from a reduction in an already overfunded plan, because unfunded liabilities will be put in part to the PBGC and in part to employees. We address this issue by adding a variable PUT to the specification of equation (2. Table 2 .3.
5). The variable PUT is defined as Max (0, JNPL). Results are shows in
Unfortunately, the data do not appear to be powerful enough to rej cot any interesting hypothesis concerning this issue. In the nore reliable 1990 and 1981 equations, there is very weak evidence that the availability of the pension put influences the marginal valuation of liabilities for troubled firms.
A final major issue suggested by the discussion in Section 1 is the role of other deferred compensation arrangements which may he correlated with our included pension variables. Firms may have implicit contracts with their workers which require them to pay older workers in excess of their marginal products. If so the capitalized value of these obligations represents a liability of the firm. This liability is of interest in its own right. In addition, it is likely to he correlated with pension liabilities.
Unfortunately, there is no apparent way to construct an estimate of firm's deferred compensation liability. As a crude apDroximation, we added three variables to equation 2.3; AGE, SLOPE, and AGExSLOPE where AGE is an estimate of the average age of a firm's workforce, SLOPE is an estimate of the slope of its age-wage profile and AGExSLOPE should enter the equation negatively. Firms with steep age-wage profiles and old work forces should have the largest deferred compensation liability. The other variables cannot he sirrned on an a triori basis.
Our estimates of AGE and SLOPE were obtained from a merge of the January and March l98 Current Population Survey tapes. This collention of data included the ages, wages, tenures and three digit employer industry codes for over forty thousand individuals. Parameters of an age distribution and an age vs. log(wage) profile were estimated for each three digit industry code.
These codes were matched to the SIC codes on the comnustat tape. In general a three digit CPS industry code corresponded to a 3 digit or in a few cases a four digit SIC code. Each firm in our sample was thus assigned a wane-age profile corresponding to its SIC industry code.
The results of estimating equation (2.5) Because the approach taken here looks at the effect of an exogenous event, a change in the interest rate on the valuation of different firms, it does not depend on any assumption about how firms decide how much to fund their pension plan. Thus the variable effect event study method used here is not subject to the weak firm problem described in the previous section.
More formally our approach is as follows. We postulate that the return on firm i, in month t, can be expressed as:
where is the normal required expected return on firm i, and it reflects its sensitivity to interest rate news, here proxied by the change in the long-term interest rate, and is a random error tern. 1Ye initially specify that depends on the firm's characteristics at time t according to: Our procedure is entirely consistent in spirit with the vect stuy methodolor that is widely used in financial economics. The anproach imvolvs looking at the response of securities prices to unexpected develonments or "news" in an effort to gauge the effects of the variables heinc studied on firms market value. Our "variable effect-event study methodolopr" represents an improvement over the techniques normally used in finance in two ways.
First, the events we look at are developments that are exogenous from -2 -the viewpoint of the firm. A standard event study approach to the problem of studying how the market values firms pension liabilities would involve looking at how firms' market value responded to news about their pension funding decision. The difficulty is that firm's decisions are themselves responses to news, or to privately held information. It is not really possible to sort out the effects of policy changes from the independent effects of their causes. Our indirect procedure of looking at the differential efects of interest rate changes on firms entirely avoids these problems. Second, our econoetric procedure is superior to the grouping techniques normally used in event studies. One could, as many financial economists would, group as firms by pension funding status, and then look at how different portfolios responded to news about interest rate developments. Such a procedure simply discards information about within-group differences in pension funding status and therefore is inefficient.
Before turning to a description of our data, it is useful to discuss the expected signs of the coefficient in (3.3) and possible biases arising fron omitted variables. We expect l and 12 to be positive reflecting the capital gains firms earn on their nominal liabilities as interest rates reduce the value of outstanding liabilities. The principal problem in estimating (3.3) is that some long-term nominal assets or liabilities which might be correlated with the included variables are excluded. These might include the value of depreciation in tax shields or of prospective lease obligations. If these variables have a systematic impact on firms' pension funding decisions, our results will he biased. However, we know of no previous arguments suggesting a role for these variables in pension funding decisions. They might, however, be related to the -2 9-amount of long term debt a firm decides to carry.
In estimating equation (3.3) we use data for the 36-month period from January, 1979 to December 1991. We assume that pension assets and liabilities are constant within each year1. Data on pension assets and liabilities are drawn from a tape provided by the EASE. Liabilities are adjusted to current interest rates using the rule of thumb described in Feldstein and Mtrok (1983) .
Essentially, this procedure involves railtiplying reported liabilities by the ratio of the actuarially assuned interest rate to the actual market interest rate. This is done on a monthly basis. The market value of long-term debt is calculated from information available on the Conpustat tape. It is assumed that all debt reported as long-term by Conpustat has a 10-year maturity and a 10 percent coupon rate. This debt is then valued using the monthly EM interest rate. The results of estimating (3.3) omitting any Z variables are reported in Table 3 .1 for various specifications of the error term. In some cases is treated as a constant, in others it is allowed to vary across firms, and in others to vary from nnth to month.
1An alternative which we intend to explore would involve interpolating net assets and liabilities within years. values pension obligations rationally. In each case the unfunded liability variable is both substantively and statistically significant. The estimates in column (1) for exanple imply that for a firm with unfunded liabilities equal to 10 percent of equity value, a one percent increase in the interest rate would raise market value by about .3 percent. While this is only about half the value that would be predicted by a naive mdel in which firms "owned" all unfunded liabilities and none of the other complicating factors discussed in the first section arose, it seems very reasonable especially in light of tax considerations.
In all the equations the debt variable has the wrong sign and it is highly statistically significant in equations (1) and (2). This finding confirns the results of French Buhack and Schwert (1903) who were unable to find any evidence in support of the nominal credit hypothesis. It also supports the Modigliani-Cohn inflation illusion hypothesis. These surprising results may alternatively be a consequence of our short sample period or of our failure to accurately measure all the firms' nominal assets and liabilities. In any event, they stand as a major puzzle. We recognize that it is inplausihle to assert as our results seen to suggest that market participants recognize the effects of increases in interest rates on pension debt but not on regular balance sheet debt. But we do not at this point have any resolution to offer.
Our results are somewhat less unsatisfactory for equation (3) where month dummies are included in the specification. The unfunded pension liahilities variable remains statistically significant in (3) , although its substantive significance is mach less than that suggested by equations (1) Table 3 .1, where RATING is a categorical variable which ranges from 1 for firms whose debt is rated P to 10 for firms whose debt is rated AM. The estimated equation was: (3, 14) p = a + AR [(25, 7 (TJVPL) While the RATING interaction variable enters significantly, it does not have an important influence on the pension variable's coefficient, which rises sliahtly.
The introduction of RATING has little effect on the anomalous debt coefficient.
A concern in previous pension research has been whether the market responds to pension liahilities as measured at market or actuarial interest 
(3.5) (2.1)
Although the coefficient on the put variable is statistically insignificant because it cannot be esti ted with any accuracy, its magnitude is consistent with our hypothesis. This evidence thus dovetails with the evidence in the preceding section on potential importance of the level of unfunded benefits.
A final issue to he considered is the relationship between a firm's pension arrangements and other parts of its compensation scheme. In the previous section we presented some crude tests of the idea that firms with steep age earnings profiles and aging work forces were valued by the market as if they had a formal debt liability to their work force. While the results were inconclusive, taking acount of this liability did not have a large iract on the estimated effect of pension obligations on firms' market valuations.
It would he desirable to exanine these questions using the methodology of this section. However, a serious problem presents itself. Any long-term implicit contract between workers and firms is likely to be formulated in real terms. The changes in interest rates which provide the basis for our tests largely reflect changing inflationary expectations. Separating out real interest rate changes in monthly data is probably not feasible. Hence we cannot 0 -in this section shed raich light on the existence of nonpension-deferred compensation. On the possibility that interest rate changes over our lYI9l sannle period night reflect real interest rate variations, or that nonpensinn long-term contracts might be nominally denominated, we re-estimated equation (3.3) with various wage growth and age structure variables included. In no case did they enter significantly or affect the magnitude of the pension coefficients.
Therefore, no results are displayed here. We reluctantly conclude that this section's method cannot be used to exanine the important deferred compensation issue.
-? -
)4 OONCLUSIO"S
The results in this paper confirms earlier analyses suggesting tha the stock market valuation of firms reasonably accurately reflects their per.sion funding situations. This conclusion is reached using alternative methodological approaches and data from several different years and so is reasonably robust.
In particular we demonstrate that it is not simply a consequence of weak firm effects. Our results also suggest that the availability of the termination an-i the pension put influences the market valuation of pension liabilities.
Finally, we provide some evidence suggesting that market valuations of firms reflect implicit contractual liabilities to pay older workers amounts in excess of their marginal products. These contractual liabilities appear to be denominated in real rather than nominal terms.
Our results provide no support for the notion that investors ignore pension liabilities in valuing firms. As a consequence, they suggest that corporate managers will benefit if they fund their plans as fully as possible.
Furthermore, they suggest that the private pension may not have a large effect on aggregate saving since both the asset and liability side of pension balance sheets influence private savings decisions.
Perhpas the most promising area suggested for future research is the market's valuation of implicit contractual liabilities to older workers. It would he desirable to extend the tests reportd here in order to get an estimate of the value of this liability. If it were to be significant, strong evidence would he provided for incentive contracting models of the labor market. 
